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We report a study that examined the modulating impact of contingent self-esteem on regret 
intensity for regretted outcomes associated with controllable versus uncontrollable events. 
the contingent self-esteem scale (e.g., Kernis & goldman, 2006) was used to assess the ex-
tent to which a person’s sense of self-worth is based on self and others’ expectations. We found 
that there was an influence of self-esteem contingency for controllable but not for uncontrol-
lable regret types. For controllable regret types individuals with a high contingent (i.e., unsta-
ble) self-esteem reported greater regret intensity than those with a low contingent (i.e., sta-
ble) self-esteem. We interpret this finding as reflecting a functional and adaptive role of high 
contingent self-esteem in terms of mobilizing the application of counterfactual reasoning 
and planning mechanisms that can enable personal expectations to be achieved in the future.
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IntroductIon
Counterfactual reasoning is a pervasive cognitive activity that occurs 
whenever we imagine how outcomes could have turned out differently, 
either for the better or for the worse. When counterfactual reasoning 
arises in the wake of a negative outcome it typically gives rise to feelings 
of regret (sometimes of a profound nature), since people envisage how 
things could have worked out better than they did. The link between 
counterfactual reasoning and regret has engendered considerable re-
search interest over the past 30 years or so, with studies having identi-
fied a number of important phenomena. One example is the so-called 
“action effect” (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), which is the tendency 
to regret action more in the short term but to regret inaction more in 
the long term (e.g., Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982; Morrison & Roese, 2011). Another example is the “temporal 
order effect”, whereby people are more likely to reason about “undo-
ing” the final event in a sequence of events that led to a negative out-
come, rather than undoing any preceding events (e.g., Byrne, Segura, 
Culhane, Tasso, & Berrocal, 2000). 
More recent research has started to examine the connections be-
tween person variables and counterfactual reasoning, including the 
association between self-esteem and perceived regret intensity (e.g., 
Feeney, Gardiner, Johnston, Jones, & McEvoy, 2005; Libby, Valenti, 
Pfent, & Eibach, 2011) and the links between depressive symptomol-
ogy and counterfactual thinking about negative personal events (e.g., 
Markman & Miller, 2006). The present paper examines a pattern of 
associations that has not previously been investigated—that is, associa-
tions between self-esteem and counterfactual reasoning for regretted 
incidents in which some of the events leading to the negative outcome 
are either under the protagonists’ control or are outside of their con-
trol. Before elaborating on the predictions relating to this study we first 
overview relevant aspects of the literature on self-esteem, counterfac-
tual reasoning, and regret. 
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Self-eSteem, counterfactual rea-
SonIng, and regret
Self-esteem is the sense of self-worth that is possessed by a person 
and it has been shown to influence how people reason about incidents 
that give rise to feelings of regret. Research examining the association 
between self-esteem and counterfactual reasoning has often used the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965), which is a 
10-item measure of state self-esteem based on responses to questions 
such as “At times I think I am no good at all” and “I wish I could have 
more respect for myself ”. For example, Feeney et al. (2005), adopting 
the RSES, asked individuals to recall regrets, either from the recent past 
or, in a second study, from across their entire life. Feeney et al. found 
that individuals with high self-esteem recalled more regrets associated 
with inaction than action, whilst low self-esteem individuals showed 
an even spread of action and inaction regrets. Feeney et al. concluded 
that these effects arise because high self-esteem people seek to “self-
enhance” by distancing themselves from having responsibility for bad 
outcomes. Recalling inaction regrets therefore makes sense in terms 
of this self-enhancement motivation since inaction is seen as being 
less causal of a negative outcome than is action (see Spranca, Minsk, 
& Baron, 1991). 
Feeney et al.’s (2005) proposal concerning the self-enhancing na-
ture of high self-esteem resonates with findings from a previous study 
by Roese and Olson (1993), who asked participants to imagine them-
selves in a situation where they were with another actor and the events 
resulted in a negative outcome (e.g., a bad grade on a group project). 
Roese and Olson obtained a measure of self-esteem using the Texas 
Social Behavior Inventory (TSBI; Helmreich & Stapp, 1974), which ex-
amines “social” self-esteem, such as perceived attractiveness and ability 
in social environments (i.e., the TBSI measures a specific rather than 
a general form of self-esteem, as is the case with the RSES). Roese and 
Olson found that high self-esteem participants were less likely than low 
self-esteem participants to change an aspect of their own behaviour in 
order to undo a negative outcome. Thus, low self-esteem individuals 
generated “self-referent” counterfactuals such as “If only I had worked 
harder then I would have received a better mark”, whereas high self-
esteem individuals generated “other-referent” counterfactuals such 
as “If only the other members of my group had worked harder then 
I would have received a better mark”. Again, then, it appears that high 
self-esteem people engage in self-enhancing attributions when assess-
ing the causal determinants of a negative outcome that they were asso-
ciated with. When viewed together, the findings of Feeney et al. (2005) 
and of Roese and Olson indicate that the self-enhancement effects as-
sociated with individuals with high self-esteem generalize across both 
global and specific self-esteem measures.
Although extant research has provided valuable insights into the 
relation between self-esteem and counterfactual reasoning with regret-
oriented scenarios, it is questionable whether the use of the RSES and 
TBSI have provided sufficient clarity as to the associations that might 
exist. Part of the problem here concerns the fact that self-esteem is, in 
fact, a highly heterogeneous and nuanced construct (e.g., Zeigler-Hill, 
Fulton, & McLemore, 2011). It has, for example, been suggested that 
self-esteem can be stable or unstable, depending upon the extent to 
which a person’s self-esteem fluctuates over time and context (Kernis, 
2005; Kernis & Waschull, 1995).
Very closely related to the concept of stability is the notion of con-
tingency, which is the extent to which a person’s sense of self-worth is 
dependent upon living up to their own and others’ expectations (e.g., 
Deci & Ryan, 1995; Kernis, 2005; see also Kernis, 2003, for evidence 
that self-esteem contingency and stability are highly correlated). “True” 
self-esteem (Deci & Ryan, 1995) is therefore viewed as being stable 
and non-contingent and refers to feelings of self-worth that are well 
anchored and secure, such that they do not depend on the attainment 
of particular outcomes and are not in need of constant validation. 
Viewing self-esteem in this manner, rather than focusing on a specific 
factor such as social self-esteem, which the TSBI does, enables us to 
have a more detailed grasp of the nuances and complexities underlying 
the relationship between self-esteem and regret.   
As we explain in our method section, the contingent basis of self-
esteem can be measured using a validated questionnaire such as the 
Contingent Self-Esteem Scale—originally developed by Paradise and 
Kernis (1999; see also Kernis & Goldman, 2006; Kernis & Paradise, 
2003). This involves 15 items that measure the degree to which a 
person’s sense of self-worth is dependent upon their own and others’ 
expectations. It is important to clarify that this scale measures self-
esteem contingency and not self-esteem per se. What this means is 
that someone who with high self-esteem as measured by traditional 
methods such as the RSES could, in contrast, be measured as having 
low “contingent self-esteem” if their sense of self-worth is highly stable 
over time and independent of changing contexts (such as task failure) 
or others’ expectations. In other words, there is no direct relation be-
tween traditional measures of self-esteem and measures of contingent 
self-esteem.
The way in which self-esteem contingency might influence regret-
based judgements in counterfactual reasoning has not been examined 
to date, yet seems to be an important avenue to explore. One relevant 
study is that reported by Greenier et al. (1999), which involved par-
ticipants completing the RSES every 12 hours based on how they felt 
at that particular time, thereby permitting a measure of self-esteem 
stability. Next, participants were asked to write about a positive and a 
negative event that had occurred each day for a fortnight and also to 
provide a rating for how each event made them feel as well as a rating of 
each event’s negativity and importance. Greenier et al. found that nega-
tive events had a more negative influence on the feelings of those with 
unstable compared to stable self-esteem. Although Greenier et al. have 
identified this interesting phenomenon relating to the elevated level of 
reactivity to negative events for those with heightened contingent self-
esteem, the authors remain moot as to a detailed explanation of such 
reactivity. They appear to see it simply as a product of self-esteem fragil-
ity, but this does rather beg the question of the theoretical mechanism 
underpinning this reactivity as well as its potential adaptive value. 
Greenier et al.’s (1999) findings do, nevertheless, suggest that the 
relationship between unstable or contingent self-esteem and regret-
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focused counterfactual reasoning may likewise be consequential for 
people, such that those with an unstable or contingent self-esteem 
may respond more negatively when reasoning counterfactually about 
negative scenarios than those with more stable and less contingent self-
esteem. This expectation formed a guiding framework for the study 
that we report subsequently, although as we discuss in the next section, 
our specific prediction in relation to the effect of contingent self-esteem 
on perceived regret intensity was also informed by the possibility that 
contingent self-esteem might show differential effects dependent on 
the controllability of the events associated with the regretted outcome 
(i.e., contingent self-esteem might modulate the way in which people 
reason about regretted incidents involving controllable vs. uncontrol-
lable events).
counterfactual reaSonIng and 
event controllabIlIty
A person’s perception of the controllability of the events that led to a 
negative outcome has been shown to be an important factor that is 
central to an understanding of counterfactual reasoning. In particular, 
studies have consistently demonstrated that people reason counter-
factually about controllable events in a different manner to how they 
reason counterfactually about uncontrollable events. A classic study is 
that reported by Girotto, Legrenzi, and Rizzo (1991), who presented 
participants with a vignette about Mr. Bianchi, who had arrived home 
too late to save his wife, who was dying from a heart attack. There were 
three events that prevented Mr. Bianchi arriving home. Two of these 
events were uncontrollable: having an asthma attack, which meant he 
had to stop to take his inhaler, and accidentally breaking his spectacles, 
which meant that he had to return to his office to get a spare pair. One 
event, however, was controllable, that is, stopping at a bar to have a beer. 
When completing an “If only...” probe of the kind typically used to elicit 
counterfactual thinking, it was found that participants were more likely 
to undo the controllable event rather than any of the uncontrollable 
events. Girotto et al. argued that the increased tendency for reasoners 
to mutate controllable events arises because it is relatively easy for peo-
ple to envisage the possibility where the controllable event simply did 
not occur (e.g., Mr. Bianchi did not stop for a beer), whereas it is more 
difficult to envisage the possibility where the uncontrollable events did 
not take place (e.g., Mr. Bianchi did not have an asthma attack). 
Wilkinson, Ball, and Cooper (2010) examined how people reason 
about controllable and uncontrollable events using a think-aloud 
methodology. The think-aloud technique involves people speaking 
aloud their thoughts whilst they are tackling a given task. It is a tech-
nique that is assumed to provide reliable insights into the cognitive 
processes arising during task performance (see Ericsson & Simon, 
1993). Think-aloud protocols have been shown to have superior valid-
ity compared to data that derive from either retrospective questioning 
or from people’s spontaneous remarks (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1993; 
Payne, 1994). The task that participants in Wilkinson et al.’s study had 
to complete was to state which of two protagonists would feel the most 
negative affect in a given scenario and to reason through how these 
two protagonists would be likely to experience the situation. Wilkinson 
et al.’s analyses of the resulting think-aloud protocols indicated that 
scenarios involving only controllable events evoked a greater level of 
highly engaged “mental simulation” compared to scenarios involving 
only uncontrollable events. Such simulation took the form of partici-
pants either pursuing extended reasoning about how they would feel in 
a given situation (e.g., Gordon, 1986) or imagining how another person 
would feel by placing themselves in their shoes and using the person’s 
likely beliefs and desires to make inferences (e.g., Goldman, 2006). In 
contrast, the scenarios describing uncontrollable events evoked greater 
levels of “theory-based” reasoning (e.g., Carruthers, 1996) compared 
to the scenarios describing controllable events. Such theory-based rea-
soning was relatively rapid and immediate and involved participants 
drawing on general folk psychological theories about how people tend 
to behave and feel under certain conditions (e.g., people will be upset 
when they miss out on something).
Wilkinson et al.’s (2010) findings suggest that different cognitive 
processes are elicited when reasoning about controllable and uncon-
trollable events, with the former being more likely to trigger simulation-
based counterfactual thinking that has the potential to engender deeper 
and more intense feelings of regret than that arising from theory-based 
reasoning in the case of uncontrollable events. Wilkinson et al. sug-
gest that counterfactual reasoning arising through mental simulation 
might have adaptive value in helping people to be better prepared if 
similar situations arise again in the future (e.g., Epstude & Roese, 2011; 
Smallman & Roese, 2009; Wong, Haselhuhn, & Kray, 2012).
The aforementioned studies by Girotto et al. (1991) and by 
Wilkinson et al. (2010) involved the use of vignette-type regrets. A 
study examining real-life regrets and issues concerning event control-
lability was reported by Wrosch and Heckhausen (2002). They found 
that having a sense of control over a regretted situation—something 
that they termed “internal-control”—resulted in different psychological 
effects for different age groups. Whilst younger adults responded posi-
tively, reporting low levels of regret and low intrusive thoughts, older 
individuals responded with high levels of regret as well as high levels 
of intrusive thoughts. Such findings indicate that there are individual 
differences between groups regarding how people respond when they 
feel they have a sense of control (or not) over the event outcome. 
PredIctIonS
In light of the aforementioned findings, such as those reported by 
Greenier et al. (1999), Girotto et al. (1991) and Wilkinson et al. (2010), 
we predicted that the regret intensity that people express for scenarios 
involving negative outcomes for controllable versus uncontrollable 
events would be modulated by the individual’s level of contingent self-
esteem. More specifically, we predicted that: (1) people with high con-
tingent self-esteem would reveal heightened regret intensity for regrets 
involving controllable events compared to people with low contingent 
self-esteem; and (2) people with high contingent self-esteem and low 
contingent self-esteem would show similar levels of regret intensity for 
regrets involving uncontrollable events. 
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These predictions are linked particularly closely to Greenier et al.’s 
(1999) observation that negative events have a more negative influence 
on the feelings of those with unstable (i.e., high contingent) compared 
to stable (i.e., low contingent) self-esteem. However, the prediction 
extends this observation to situations involving negative outcomes in 
the wake of controllable events of a type that could easily have been 
affected by the individual’s own actions. In relation to such regretted 
scenarios the assumption is that those with high contingent self-
esteem, when reflecting on the regretted situation, would feel that their 
self-worth is particularly challenged by their own behaviors that they 
had control over, with such insecurities thence leading to heightened 
regret intensities relative to those with low contingent self-esteem. 
These latter individuals, whose self-esteem is robust and independent 
of expectations, are unlikely to feel that their self-worth is challenged 
even when reflecting on regretted situations where they had control 
over the events that led to a negative outcome. In the case of regrets 
involving uncontrollable events that led to negative outcomes, we as-
sume that such situations would be viewed similarly by individuals 
with high versus low contingent self-esteem given that the events arose 
independent of any role that the individual played within the scenario. 
In the present research we addressed head on this novel prediction 
concerning the interaction between event controllability for regretted 
outcomes and contingent self-esteem.
method
Participants
An opportunity sample of 109 participants was recruited for the study 
from a UK University campus. There were 52 males, 50 females and 7 
gave no information regarding gender. Participants were aged between 
18 and 61 years (Mage = 22.7 years, SDage = 5.5 years). Because of techni-
cal errors with our study booklets as well as missing regret data we 
reduced our sample to 85 participants (i.e., 42 males, 39 females and 
4 who gave no information regarding gender; age range = 18 and 44 
years; Mage = 23.0 years; SDage = 5.4 years).
Design
A mixed within-between participants design was adopted, with a 
within-participant factor of regret condition with two levels, that is, 
controllable events versus uncontrollable events, and a between-par-
ticipants factor of contingent self-esteem with two levels, that is, low 
contingent self-esteem versus high contingent self-esteem. The levels 
of the self-esteem factor reflected a median split of the self-esteem data 
(see below for further discussion).
Materials and Procedure
Participants were tested individually or in small groups and were 
asked to complete a questionnaire booklet containing the Paradise 
and Kernis (1999) Contingent Self-Esteem Scale (see also Kernis & 
Goldman, 2006; Kernis & Paradise, 2003; Zeigler-Hill, Besser, & King, 
2011). Participants are given 15 statements and have to rate how much 
each statement is like them on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all like me, 
3 = neutral, and 5 = very much like me). These statements either cor-
respond to perceived expectations of others (e.g., “My overall feelings 
about myself are heavily influenced by how much other people like and 
accept me”) or to self-expectations (e.g., “Even in the face of failure, my 
feelings of self-worth remain unaffected”). After completing the ques-
tionnaire participants’ scores were aggregated (with some items reverse 
coded) so as to give a total score of self-esteem contingency, with a 
higher score reflecting more contingent self-esteem that is unstable, 
insecure, and fragile in nature.
Participants were asked to generate two personal regrets from their 
lives, one that involved events that were completely within their control 
and the other that involved events that were completely outside of their 
control. The order of regret generation (controllable or uncontrol-
lable) was counterbalanced across participants, as was whether they 
generated these regrets before or after completing the Contingent Self-
Esteem Scale. An example of a controllable regret might be leaving an 
assignment to the last minute due to engaging in an overabundance of 
social activities, whereas an example of an uncontrollable regret might 
be missing an assignment deadline having had a loved one pass away 
through a sudden illness. Participants were asked to write about each 
regret in as much detail as possible and rate their regret intensity on 
a 7-point scale (1 = little regret; 7 = a great deal of regret). They were 
also requested to rate their sense of control over the regret, again using 
a 7-point scale (1 = fully out of my control; 7 = fully in my control). 
Participants responded to these questions as part of a larger study ex-
amining the nature of people’s reasoning about regrets. After complet-
ing the study participants were debriefed. The study was approved by 
the University Ethics Committee.
reSultS
For all of the statistical analyses reported below the alpha level was set 
at .05.
Contingent Self-Esteem Scale: 
Reliability Checks and Group 
Membership Criteria
The internal consistency of the Contingent Self-Esteem Scale for our 
sample was acceptable (Cronbach’s alpha = .80) and in line with what 
has been found by other researchers (e.g., Zeigler-Hill, Besser et al., 
2011). Most studies examining self-esteem and counterfactual think-
ing have adopted a median split to separate participants into different 
self-esteem groups (see Feeney et al., 2005; McDaniel & Pettijohn, 
2013). For consistency with the extant literature we adopted the same 
approach, with our median split resulting in a low contingent self-
esteem group (N = 51, M = 46.20, SD = 5.07, range = 31 to 52) and 
a high contingent self-esteem group (N = 34, M = 58.71, SD = 3.98, 
range = 53 to 70). 
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Controllable Versus Uncontrollable 
Regrets: Manipulation Checks
Our main experimental manipulation was regret controllability, with 
participants being requested to generate two regrets, one involving 
controllable events and the other involving uncontrollable events, 
which they then rated for controllability and regret intensity. Before 
progressing to an analysis of the regret intensity data we first conducted 
a manipulation check to determine that participants’ self-generated re-
grets polarized effectively on the 7-point controllability scale that they 
used to rate them. 
To undertake this manipulation check we conducted a 2 × 2 
mixed-design ANOVA on the controllability ratings (see Table 1 for 
mean data), where the between-participants factor was contingent 
self-esteem group (high vs. low contingent self-esteem) and where the 
within-participant factor was regret type (i.e., controllable vs. uncon-
trollable events). This analysis revealed a significant main effect of re-
gret type, with controllable regrets being rated as being associated with 
a greater sense of control over events than uncontrollable regrets, F(1, 
83) = 133.05, MSE = 2.29, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.62. This finding therefore 
confirms the effectiveness of the regret type manipulation. Importantly, 
there was no effect of self-esteem group on controllability ratings, F < 1, 
and neither was there a significant interaction between regret type and 
self-esteem group, F(1,83) = 1.60, MSE = 2.29, p = .21, ηp2  = 0.02. 
Event Controllability, Regret 
Intensity, and Contingent Self-
Esteem
Our key experimental predictions were that people with high contin-
gent self-esteem would show heightened regret intensity for regrets 
involving controllable events compared to people with low contingent 
self-esteem, whilst people with high contingent self-esteem and low 
contingent self-esteem would show similar levels of regret intensity for 
regrets involving uncontrollable events. Our findings appear to support 
these predictions. As can be seen from Table 2, for the controllable re-
gret type the high contingent self-esteem group reported higher regret 
intensity than the low contingent self-esteem group, whereas for the 
uncontrollable regret type there are little differences in rated regret 
intensities across the two self-esteem groups1. 
A 2 × 2 mixed-design ANOVA was conducted on regret intensity 
ratings, where the between-participants factor was contingent self-
esteem group (high vs. low contingent self-esteem) and where the 
within-participant factor was regret type (controllable vs. uncontrol-
lable events). This analysis revealed that there was neither a main effect 
of self-esteem group, F(1, 83) = 1.16, MSE = 3.16, p = .29, ηp2 = 0.01, 
nor a main effect of regret type, F < 1. In line with predictions, however, 
there was a significant interaction between regret type and self-esteem 
group, F(1, 83) = 4.03, MSE = 1.68, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.05. 
To clarify the effects underlying this significant interaction in re-
lation to our predictions we conducted separate simple main effects 
analyses for the controllable and for the uncontrollable regrets. For con-
trollable regrets we found a significant simple main effect of contingent 
self-esteem group, whereby the regret intensity of controllable regrets 
was rated higher by individuals with high contingent self-esteem than 
individuals with low contingent self-esteem, F(1, 83) = 5.05, MSE = 
2.36, p < .05, ηp2 = 0.05. For uncontrollable regrets no significant simple 
main effect was in evidence, F < 1. These simple main effects analyses 
conform to the predicted modulating effect of contingent self-esteem 
on controllable versus uncontrollable regret types.   
We corroborated these latter effects using linear regression analyses 
in which we treated contingent self-esteem as a continuous variable 
rather than as a dichotomous variable. The first model that we exam-
ined was for controllable regret types, with the continuous predictor 
being contingent self-esteem and the dependent variable being regret 
intensity. This model was found to be reliable, R = .24, adjusted R2 = 
.05, F(1, 84) = 5.20, p < .025. The second model that we examined was 
for uncontrollable regret types, with the continuous predictor again 
being contingent self-esteem and the dependent variable being regret 
intensity. This model was not reliable, R = .11, adjusted R2 = .001, F(1, 
84) = 1.07, p = .34.
tAble 1. 
Mean Ratings of Feelings of Control for Different Regret Types 
as a Function of Level of Contingent Self-Esteem
Regret Type
Self-esteem 
group Controllable Uncontrollable Mean
High 
contingent 
self-esteem
5.37 (1.41) 2.94 (1.98) 4.16
Low 
contingent 
self-esteem
5.68 (1.47) 2.65 (1.81) 4.17
Mean 5.53 2.80
Note. SD in parenthesis.
tAble 2. 
Mean Ratings of Regret Intensities for Different Regret Types 
as a Function of Level of Contingent Self-Esteem
Regret Type
Self-esteem 
group Controllable Uncontrollable Mean
High 
contingent 
self-esteem
5.47 (1.50) 5.24 (1.56) 5.36
Low 
contingent 
self-esteem
4.76 (1.58) 5.34 (1.56) 5.05
Mean 5.12 5.29
Note. SD in parenthesis.
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Regret Intensity Ratings and Order 
Effects
We conducted a simple check to determine whether question ordering 
had any impact on regret intensity ratings, bearing in mind that the or-
der of regret type was counterbalanced in our experimental design. We 
conducted a 2 × 2 mixed-design ANOVA on regret intensity ratings, 
where the within-participant factor was regret type (controllable vs. 
uncontrollable) and where the between-participants factor was order 
of regret type (controllable first vs. uncontrollable first). This ANOVA 
revealed that there was no influence of regret type order, neither as a 
main effect nor in interaction with regret type, both Fs < 1. 
We finally ascertained whether completing the self-esteem ques-
tionnaire before or after generating and rating the two regret types had 
any impact on regret intensity ratings. To do this we conducted a 2 × 
2 mixed-design ANOVA on regret intensity ratings, where the within-
participant factor was regret type (controllable vs. uncontrollable) and 
where the between-participants factor was order of responding (regrets 
first vs. self-esteem questionnaire first). Again, this ANOVA revealed 
that there was no influence of response order, either as a main effect or 
in interaction with regret type, both Fs < 1. 
general dIScuSSIon
Existing research on the association between self-esteem and coun-
terfactual reasoning has used either the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965) to assess the impact of self-esteem on the recall of 
regretted life events (Feeney et al., 2005) or the Texas Social Behavior 
Inventory (Helmreich & Stapp, 1974), to assess the aspects of regret-
ted events that are mutated to undo a negative outcome (Roese & 
Olson, 1993). This research has failed to recognise that self-esteem is 
a dynamic construct that varies in its stability over time and contexts 
(Kernis, 2005; Kernis & Waschull, 1995; Zeigler-Hill, Besser et al., 
2011; Zeigler-Hill, Fulton et al., 2011). For some, self-esteem is highly 
contingent upon personal expectations that need to be lived up to or 
expectations that others are believed to have of them (Deci & Ryan, 
1995; Kernis, 2005). To date no studies appear to have examined the 
relation between contingent self-esteem and regretted events associ-
ated with longer-term counterfactual thinking.
In the present research we set out to bridge this gap in our under-
standing by examining the influence of contingent self-esteem (e.g., 
Kernis, 2005; Kernis & Waschull, 1995) on regret intensity for con-
trollable versus uncontrollable regret types. The former involve prior 
events associated with a negative outcome that were under one’s con-
trol (e.g., acts of commission or omission), whereas the latter involve 
prior events associated with a negative outcome that were outside of 
one’s control (e.g., accidents or misfortunes). Previous studies suggest 
that people show an increased tendency to mutate controllable events 
rather than uncontrollable ones, presumably because it is more difficult 
to envisage the possibility of an uncontrollable event not having hap-
pened (e.g., Girotto et al., 1991).
Notwithstanding Girotto et al.’s (1991) findings, the question of 
whether contingent self-esteem has a modulating influence on judg-
ments relating to controllable and uncontrollable regret types has 
remained unanswered until the present study. In formulating our 
research we derived the prediction that for controllable regret types it 
would be individuals with high contingent self-esteem who would re-
port greater regret intensity relative to individuals with low contingent 
self-esteem, whereas for uncontrollable regret types there would be no 
difference between groups in regret intensity ratings. This prediction 
was informed by findings reported by Greenier et al. (1999) indicating 
that individuals with unstable or contingent self-esteem respond more 
negatively when reasoning counterfactually about negative-outcome 
scenarios than those with more stable and less contingent self-esteem. 
Such a finding may arise as a consequence of participants feeling re-
sponsible for the outcome, since such events challenge their perceived 
sense of self-worth (e.g., when receiving a poor mark for an assignment 
they begin to doubt themselves rather than viewing the mark as just a 
one-off occurrence that can be attributed, say, to a strict marker). The 
results of our study supported the predicted modulation of regret type 
by contingent self-esteem in relation to regret intensity responses, that 
is: (1) for controllable regret types those individuals with high contin-
gent self-esteem reported greater regret intensity relative to individuals 
with low contingent self-esteem; and (2) for uncontrollable regret types 
there was no difference in regret intensity ratings for those with high 
versus low contingent self-esteem.
In interpreting this predicted modulation effect arising from indi-
vidual differences in contingent self-esteem we propose that individu-
als with high contingent self-esteem respond to regretted incidents that 
they have control over by invoking thoughts to the effect that they have 
failed to live up to their own or others’ expectations. Such thoughts will 
promote deeper feelings of regret than arise for individuals with low 
contingent self-esteem, whose feelings of self-worth are more stable, 
less expectation-driven, and less in need of validation. Our results align 
with the findings of Kernis and Paradise (2003), who showed that more 
negative affect (in the form of anger) occurred for those with a high 
contingent self-esteem in the wake of negative feedback in comparison 
to those with low contingent self-esteem. 
Our findings, together with those of Kernis and Paradise (2003) 
and Greenier et al. (1999), suggest that people with high contingent 
self-esteem respond in a more negative, hostile, or intense manner 
than those with low contingent self-esteem in the wake of negative 
outcomes. We suggest that this mode of responding may have at its 
core the application of adaptive mechanisms that are directed toward 
future self-achievement in relation to personal expectations. For exam-
ple, in the case of having intense regret for controllable events that led 
to negative outcomes an individual with high contingent self-esteem 
can engage in a process of counterfactual reasoning about how things 
could have turned out differently, which can thereby elicit planning 
for the future (Epstude & Roese, 2011). By engaging in such planning, 
high contingent self-esteem individuals can feel that the expectations 
that determine their self-worth can be lived up to at a future time.
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This account also explains why we found no evidence for contin-
gent self-esteem having an influence on regret intensity for regret-
ted outcomes associated with uncontrollable events. In the wake of 
a negative outcome for events outside of one’s control one’s sense of 
self-worth remains unchallenged since one could not have influenced 
the outcome anyway. Although we did not obtain any direct measure 
of how participants were reasoning about regretted situations, the fact 
that imagined events can be mutated more easily for controllable than 
uncontrollable regrets (Girotto et al., 1991; Wilkinson et al., 2010) 
provides a mechanism whereby individuals with high contingent self-
esteem can ascertain how they could have done things differently so 
as to gain insight into meeting expectations for effective behaviour in 
the future. 
Our data also suggest that individuals with low contingent self-es-
teem may be actively engaged in ego-protection and self-enhancement 
processes in dealing with regretted scenarios involving controllable 
events. This possibility is evidenced by the fact that their regret in-
tensity ratings for these scenarios were substantially lower than those 
for scenarios involving uncontrollable events, which is a curious re-
sult unless one assumes that low contingent self-esteem individuals 
are down-playing their causal role in situations involving a regretted 
outcome and also disengaging from the plan-oriented thinking that 
could promote improved outcomes in similar, future scenarios. Such 
ego-protection resonates with the proposals of Feeney et al. (2005), 
who present evidence that people with high self-esteem self-enhance 
by distancing themselves from taking responsibility for bad outcomes 
(cf. Brown & Mankowski, 1993).
Although we have presented a positive account of the role that high 
contingent self-esteem can play for future planning and expectation 
attainment we recognise there is a downside to having highly unstable 
or contingent self-esteem in that the individual will constantly need 
to seek validation from either themselves or from others for their be-
haviours, which is not viewed as psychologically healthy (e.g., Borton, 
Crimmins, Ashby, & Ruddiman, 2012; Crocker, Karpinski, Quinn, 
& Chase, 2003; Crocker & Knight, 2005; Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, 
Wheatman & Goldman, 2000; Park & Crocker, 2005). Furthermore, 
if one’s contingent self-esteem is too high then this may lead one to 
become very negatively affected and potentially de-motivated to try to 
do better in the future. At the same time it is also not psychologically 
healthy to have very low contingent self-esteem, since event outcomes 
will not challenge one’s sense of self-worth so as to motivate one to do 
things better next time and avoid attributing failures to others. 
More research is needed to explore the links between differ-
ent degrees of self-esteem contingency and these motivational and 
expectation-attainment aspects of behaviour linked to future action-
planning and it is noteworthy that researchers have recently started to 
examine the relation between self-esteem contingency and self-esteem 
level. For example, Zeigler-Hill, Besser et al. (2011) adopted both the 
RSES and the Contingent Self-Esteem Scale to examine how people 
predict they will feel faced with situations of interpersonal rejection 
and failure. They found that those individuals with a high contingent 
self-esteem predicted that they would feel greater negative affect in the 
wake of these outcomes relative to individuals with a low contingent 
self-esteem. It would be useful to examine the relation between self-
esteem and self-esteem contingency in future research involving con-
trollable and uncontrollable event outcomes. Another important point 
to note concerns the link between self-esteem and depression. A recent 
longitudinal analysis that examined the relation between depressive 
symptomology, contingent self-esteem, and self-esteem level found 
that the latter was a unique predictor of depressive symptomology, 
whilst contingent self-esteem did not predict depressive symptoms 
when taking self-esteem level into account (Wouters et al., 2013). Such 
findings reinforce the importance of Zeigler-Hill, Besser et al.’s (2011) 
study examining self-esteem level and contingency together.  
We finally note a potential confound in our study that may limit the 
interpretation of our findings, which relates to the fact that participants 
were requested to generate regretted events prior to rating these for in-
tensity and event controllability2. Using this methodology it is possible 
that high and low contingent self-esteem individuals differ in the re-
gret scenarios that they can think of, with high contingent self-esteem 
participants generating controllable regret types that are “objectively” 
more intensely regrettable than those generated by low contingent self-
esteem participants. This is clearly an issue that needs to be addressed 
in follow-on research. We suggest that a good way forward would be 
to present individuals with tightly controlled regret-oriented scenarios 
experienced by another protagonist and then ask for intensity and 
controllability ratings. Such highly controlled materials would clarify 
whether high contingent self-esteem continues to be associated with 
elevated regret intensity, thereby corroborating and generalising the 
effects observed in the present study.  
To conclude, this paper has demonstrated that people with high 
contingent self-esteem report greater regret intensity than people with 
low contingent self-esteem for controllable but not for uncontrollable 
event outcomes associated with regrettable incidents. In other words, a 
person’s perceived regret for controllable versus uncontrollable regret 
types is modulated by their contingent self-esteem. We suggest that this 
novel finding indicates that contingent self-esteem may be functional 
in terms of mobilizing the application of counterfactual reasoning and 
planning mechanisms that can enable personal expectations to be 
achieved in the future (cf. Epstude & Roese, 2011). We further propose 
that research on counterfactual reasoning needs to move away from 
the issue of whether one’s self-esteem is low or high, as in most previ-
ous studies (e.g., Feeney et al., 2005), and instead focus more on the 
effects of self-esteem contingency and stability. We hope that our study 
goes some way toward expanding this important research avenue.
Footnotes
1 The regret intensity data presented in Table 2 indicate that there 
was a tendency (albeit non-reliable) for participants to have more 
intense levels of regret for situations involving uncontrollable events 
compared to situations involving controllable events. These findings 
align well with those reported by Wrosch and Heckhausen (2002), who 
showed that younger adults of similar mean age to our participants 
AdvAnces in cognitive PsychologyreseArch Article
http://www.ac-psych.org2015 • volume 11(1) • 22-3029
likewise showed heightened regret intensity for “low control” relative 
to “high control” regrets. 
2 We are very grateful to the Action Editor who handled our manu-
script for alerting us to this potential confound. 
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